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INTRODUCTION 
In the later decade Russia continued progress in terms of economic growth and lowering 
poverty. The per capita Gross National Income (GNI) in Russia was last recorded at 
23,770 dollars per year (in 2011 PPP), comparable to that of Latvia, Poland, Hungary or 
Chile (IBRD/WB, 2017). Yet Russia was much less successful in reducing income 
inequality which skyrocketed after the market liberalization reforms in the early 1990s. 
Currently inequality in Russia has stabilized at the level above the world’s average: the 
Gini coefficient for an average of seventy-eight advanced and developing countries 
circa 2010 was 0.38 (Lustig, 2015), while it was around 0.420 in Russia.  
Most research on the redistributive impacts of public policies has been conducted on the 
established welfare states – the members of the European Union (EU) or high-income 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(for instance, see Mahler and Jesuit (2006); OECD (2008); OECD (2011); Kammer et 
al. (2012); Immervoll et al. (2006); Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005); Bradley et al. 
(2003). Welfare states of the former Soviet Union, apart from the Baltic countries, are 
studied rarely and for the most part separately from the European welfare states (for 
instance, IBRD/WB (2005); Weigand and Grosh (2008)). The Russian case, however, is 
highly interesting due to a unique combination of strong elements of path dependency 
(socialist legacies) with radical liberalization and welfare state retrenchment in the 
1990s, and since mid-2000s – a revival of welfare statism (Cerami, 2009; Cook, 2010b). 
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Tax-benefit policy played a big role especially in the period after the economic crisis of 
2008-2009 in opposite to the period before (1990s to the second half of 2000s), when 
households’ incomes were mainly driven through labor channel. Among all measures of 
tax-benefit system pensions dominated. They were the main driver of income growth 
for most groups of population. Excluding pensions, the tax-benefit system was not very 
redistributive in Russia, because it relies a lot on the regressive indirect transfers and 
has rather small means-tested benefit component (Lustig et al., 2017).  
Current macroeconomic environment with continuous recession which started in 2014 
and massive terms of trade shock due to collapse of oil prices limits fiscal space. Under 
these conditions it would be less possible to continue previous social policy that was not 
very well targeted. This, combined with projected trends in inflation and shrinking 
private incomes, threatens to reverse Russia’s substantial achievements in terms of 
raising incomes of the population and reducing poverty. This paper explores the main 
channels of income redistribution in Russia in 2014 and evaluates Russia’ performance 
in the international context. Analysis is based on the incidence analysis under the 
Commitment to Equity (CEQ) framework that assesses the distributional impact of a 
country’s taxes and transfers (Lustig and Higgins, 2013). Data comes from the 2014 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey by Higher School of Economics (available at 
https://www.hse.ru/en/rlms/). First, we quantify the impact of direct and indirect taxes 
and cash and in-kind transfers on inequality in general and on the welfare of different 
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demographic and age groups and households. We also examine the extent to which 
taxes and social spending in Russia are progressive (i.e., whether the average transfer 
declines with income) and equalizing. We conclude with a discussion as regards to how 
the redistributive capacity of the system can be enhanced.  
The contributions of this paper are four-fold. First, we examine actual outcomes in 
terms of inequality and poverty and assess the extent to which these outcomes can be 
attributed to various welfare state policies. This is in contrast with other studies on the 
Russian welfare state which focused on the analysis of institutional indicators (Cerami, 
2009; Cook, 2010b; Cook, 2007; Cook, 2010a; Manning and Tikhonova, 2004).  
Second, we estimate the cumulative impact of the whole tax-benefit system (including 
direct and indirect taxes, cash transfers and transfers in kind such as public education 
and healthcare). The previous studies of the redistribution in Russia focused on the 
impact assessment of separate policy instruments, such as child and maternity benefits 
(Denisova et al., 2000; Ovcharova and Popova, 2005; Ovcharova et al., 2007; Notten 
and Gassmann, 2008; Popova, 2016; Popova, 2013), in-kind benefits and subsidies 
(Volchkova et al., 2006), direct taxes (Duncan, 2014) or indirect taxes (Decoster, 2003). 
Third, since this paper applies the CEQ approach, the results for Russia are comparable 
with those for other countries for which the framework has been applied previously. 
Fourth, we compare the results for 2014 with those obtained in the previous CEQ study 
for Russia using the 2010 data (Lustig et al., 2017).  
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THE RUSSIAN WELFARE STATE: INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
In 1991 Russia inherited a tax-benefit system shaped by the ideology, institutions and 
social needs of the previous regime (IBRD/WB, 2007). The Soviet Union was a 
centrally administered economy in which government assumed responsibility for 
provision of full employment and social protection. Wage policies were egalitarian, in 
contrast to prevailing patterns in market economies, but a variety of in-kind benefits (so 
called “privileges”) were provided to employees, in addition to wages, through 
enterprises by mandate of the state (Commander and Jackman, 1997). Using Esping-
Andersen’s criteria (1990), the main characteristics of ‘the state socialist model’ 
included: a large-scale de-commodification through price subsidization; a suppressed 
social stratification; and a widespread reliance on the state in all areas of welfare 
provision (Manning and Tikhonova, 2004). A larger part of social protection came in 
the form of basic, but universally accessible public services (childcare, education and 
healthcare). The system of social transfers prioritized the provision of social benefits to 
individuals with merits for their service to the country (e.g. war and labour veterans, 
representatives of bureaucracy) and social insurance benefits to employees (pensions, 
disability allowances). Social assistance to low-income families existed (e.g. benefits 
for lone parents and families with many children) but was not prioritized.  
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The neoliberal reform strategy embraced by the new Russian government that came into 
power in 1991, put the main emphasis on deregulation and privatization of public 
services, in order to cut public spending, boost efficiency in allocation of resources and 
increase competition in social services, while the population was thrown back onto its 
private resources (Burawoy, 2001). This ‘shock therapy’ was expected to displace 
people for a short time, but to provide the basis for future growth in the long run 
(Gerber, 1998). In a relatively short period of time Russia has become an example of the 
residual welfare model (Cook, 2007; Manning and Tikhonova, 2004; Titterton, 2006). 
Neoliberal reform strategies have proved very ambivalent, and even counterproductive 
to the goal of economic development of Russia, and particularly detrimental for human 
development, resulting in an unprecedented growth in poverty and inequality.  
Since the mid-2000s, the Russian welfare state has been expanding, due to high 
commodity prices which greatly increased the budgetary capacities of the state, and also 
due to the ‘populist’ strategies adopted by the Russian authorities, in order to secure the 
political support of the population (Cerami, 2009; Cook, 2010b). Despite partial 
privatization of social services, childcare, education and healthcare remain to a large 
extent public and free at the point of use, but there are user fees for services beyond the 
basic coverage and informal payments are still quite widespread in healthcare. The 
system of social transfers is dominated by pensions and categorical benefits which are 
mainly targeted at people of old age. A large share of the population is covered by one 
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or another type of government transfers, but the amounts of the majority of cash 
benefits do not reach the subsistence level. The attempts to reduce the number of 
eligible people by introducing means-testing procedures were largely unsuccessful. In 
2005, a reform aimed at monetizing the categorical in-kind benefits (former 
“privileges”) resulted in massive public protests. The failure of that reform set limits to 
further structural changes in social policies. The ‘national projects’ initiated in 2006 
proposed increases in financing of social programmes without any significant 
restructuring (Gel’man and Starodubtsev, 2016). The government has implemented a 
series of increases in earnings of the public sector workers, the minimum wage, pension 
benefits and a revision of maternity and childcare benefits aimed at promoting the 
falling fertility rates (Ovcharova et al., 2007). At the same time, despite the inflow of 
energy revenues, the fiscal capacities of the state remain limited due to poorly regulated 
social insurance markets and large scale informality and tax avoidance (Gimpelson and 
Kapeliushnikov, 2014). Thus the contemporary Russian welfare state represents a mix 
of a state socialist and liberal welfare models.  
 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL 
SPENDING AND TAX REVENUES   
Russia is one of the post-socialist countries that underwent the hardest economic 
recession in the 1990s alongside an abrupt increase in income and earnings inequality 
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(Supplementary Appendix, Figure A1). It was expected that the transition from a 
planned economy to a market economy would lead to a growth in income inequality 
because of the collapse of ideological barriers that constrained wage and income 
disparities (Milanovic, 1999). A long period of economic downturn, which in its final 
stage overlapped with the Asian financial crisis, ended in the default in 1998. After that 
a period of quick recovery and economic upturn followed, caused mainly by growth in 
the global commodity prices.  In terms of overall growth, between 1999 and 2014, 
increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 4.65% a year. During this period 
the positive trend was only interrupted by the 2008-09 crisis (when GDP declined by 
around 7.8%), after which growth quickly resumed and continued until 2014. The 
current recession started in the fourth quarter of 2014 and deepened in 2015, driven by 
the sharp fall in the terms of trade (as oil prices dropped) and economic sanctions. The 
welfare state support for incomes was more limited than in the aftermath of the 2008/09 
global financial crisis, due to the tight budget situation as oil revenues fell. A further 
contraction in real GDP (by 1.9%) in 2016 and low real growth of 1.1% in 2017 is 
projected (IBRD/WB, 2016).  
Income inequality in Russia, on the other hand, has not declined after a period of sharp 
growth in the early 1990s and only stabilized towards the second decade of the 21 
century at the level above the world’s average (Gini index of 0.42): the Gini coefficient 
for an average of seventy-eight advanced and developing countries circa 2010 was 0.38 
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(Lustig, 2015). A conjunctural economic growth which was not supported by an equal 
growth in labor productivity, inhibited the government attempts to reduce inequality by 
means of income redistribution, in spite of a substantial reduction in wage inequality 
(Calvo et al., 2015). It is worth noting that Gini index for disposable income has finally 
declined during the current recession (0.412 in 2015), most likely because incomes of 
the better-off people were hit harder by the depreciation of the national currency. At the 
same time, poverty measured by the national poverty line has increased from 10.8% of 
the population in 2013 to 13.3% in 2015 and is likely to grow further (IBRD/WB, 
2016), after of more than a decade of constant poverty reduction (Rosstat, 2017). 
The structure of social spending in Russia in 2014 is shown in Supplementary 
Appendix, Table A1. Russia spends less on human capital than OECD high-income 
economies; education and especially health spending (at 4.3 and 3.9% of GDP, 
respectively) are lower than the average for OECD countries, while social protection is 
closer to the OECD average (OECD, 2015; OECD, 2016). Much of the redistribution on 
the social spending side takes place through pensions. Public pensions accounted for 
41% of total social spending or 8.6% of GDP in 2014. Other direct transfers accounted 
for 4.5% of GDP and only a small fraction of them are means-tested (0.4% of GDP).  
Government revenues in Russia depend heavily on indirect taxes (Supplementary 
Appendix, Table A2). Compared to OECD countries, Russia’s share of indirect taxes is 
high and proceeds from personal income tax (PIT) and corporate income tax (CIT) are 
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lower. The flat personal income tax of 13% is low, though its introduction, combined 
with tight restrictions on deductions and exclusions, simplified administration and has 
been associated with higher compliance (Ivanova et al., 2005). Going forward, there are 
several directions that a rebalancing of revenues in favor of non-oil sources may take, 
including continued improvements in compliance, an examination of the small business 
tax regime and a look at options for increasing revenues from the PIT and CIT.  
Low oil prices and an economy in recession means that Russia is facing consolidation 
pressures after more than a decade of a relative prosperity. According to our 
calculations from the Ministry of Finance and Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS) 
data, real government spending fell in 2015 by 1.7% and a deeper fiscal consolidation is 
expected to continue in 2016. This follows a period of rapid expenditure growth fuelled 
by high oil revenues: the weight of general government expenditures as a share of GDP 
rose from 31.6% in 2005 to 38.7% in 2014 (Supplementary Appendix, Figure A2). The 
growth in government spending went disproportionately to fund increases in social 
transfers—pensions and other social protection benefits rose by 3.6% of GDP—
economic affairs (including subsidies to promote general economic and commercial 
policies and programs) and public order and defence. Health and education spending 
rises were more muted and share of spending on human capital declined. Revenues as a 
share of GDP have not expanded to the same degree as expenditures: while in real terms 
revenues expanded, the weight of general government revenues as a share of GDP fell 
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from 39.7% in 2005 to 37.5% in 2014. Oil revenues contribute a sizable share of overall 
resources, equalling 11.4% of GDP in 2014. Given the volatility of oil revenues and the 
sharp drop in prices, the challenge will be to strengthen non-oil revenue collection. 
Indirect taxes dominate and over time there has been a rise in social insurance 
contributions and a shrinking revenue contribution from CIT.  
 
METHODOLOGY, DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS  
The role of the state in redistributing market income is one of the key policy concerns in 
contemporary market economies. This paper evaluates the effect of the tax-benefit 
policy in Russia on poverty and inequality using the CEQ framework. This 
methodology allocates taxes and benefits (both cash and in-kind) to individuals in the 
household survey so that one can compare incomes before taxes and transfers with 
incomes after taxes and transfers (see Lustig and Higgins (2013) for more details).  
We are using the following income concepts. Our starting point is market income, i.e. 
household income before any tax-benefit interventions have taken place. It comprises 
income from all forms of employment, capital income (rent and dividends) and private 
transfers. By subtracting direct taxes and social insurance contributions and adding 
direct cash transfers (pensions and other social benefits) we arrive at disposable income. 
Typically, analysis stops here (for instance, see Mahler and Jesuit (2006); OECD 
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(2008); OECD (2011); Kammer et al. (2012); Immervoll et al. (2006); Kenworthy and 
Pontusson (2005); Bradley et al. (2003)). In our case we compute two more income 
concepts. By subtracting indirect taxes (VAT and excises) and adding subsidies we 
arrive at post-fiscal or consumable income which reflects the actual amount of market 
goods and services consumed by households. Out final income includes the cash 
equivalent of the cost of public health and education services consumed by households. 
This work draws on the CEQ analysis for Russia based on Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) data for 2010 (Lustig et al., 2017). The analysis in 
this paper uses the RLMS-HSE data for 2014, namely, a cross-sectional sample of 
12,908 individuals and 4,872 households. Data adjustments included: imputation of 
user-missing data on earnings, income or expenditure, or other important variables; and 
the grossing weights (i.e. the weights provided with the original data were scaled up to 
the overall population). CEQ analysis relies as much as possible on information about 
social transfers and taxes reported in the survey. If the survey does not include questions 
on certain items, the values were either simulated or imputed. The social transfers and 
taxes included on our analysis are listed in Tables 1 and 2. In total it covers about 90% 
of social spending and 50% of tax revenues in Russia.    
Assessments of government redistribution in countries with comprehensive public 
pension systems inevitably confront the problem of measuring the pre-government 
income, or the counterfactual to the income households actually receive and consume 
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(Mahler and Jesuit, 2010). The second-order effect of state guarantees in such countries 
is that pensioners make little other provision for retirement. If this is not accounted for 
the extent of government redistribution can be exaggerated compared to countries with 
sizable private pensions systems. Given the overwhelming weight of the pension system 
in Russia, both as a source of revenue (pension contributions represent 14% of total 
government revenues) and as a component of social spending (spending on contributory 
pensions is 38.5% of total social spending), this paper analyzes the redistributive and 
poverty reducing effect of the tax-benefit system under two extreme assumptions: 
contributory pensions are treated as direct transfer, contributions to the pension system 
are subtracted from gross income (baseline scenario); and contributory pensions are 
treated as a part of market income, contributions to the pension system are treated as 
lifetime earnings and not subtracted from gross income (sensitivity scenario). In reality 
the distinction between contributory and non-contributory pensions in Russia is quite 
arbitrary because a large share of the budget of the Pension Fund (39% in 2014) is 
covered by transfers from the Federal Budget (Rosstat, 2017). These two scenarios can 
be considered as an upper and a lower bound of a true estimate of the distributional 
impact of the tax-benefit system.  
The analysis used here is point-in-time and does not incorporate behavioural or general 
equilibrium effects. The analysis is based on economic rather than statutory tax 
incidence. For example, it is assumed that personal income taxes and contributions by 
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employees and employers are borne by labour in the formal sector. Individuals who are 
not contributing to social security are assumed to pay neither direct taxes nor 
contributions. Consumption taxes are fully shifted forward to consumers. The welfare 
indicator used is income per capita in accordance with the national statistical practice. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that CEQ framework is aimed at incidence analysis using 
amounts reported in the survey, therefore the annual amounts of tax revenues and social 
spending do not necessarily coincide with those found in other sources, in particular 
National Accounts. 
 
RESULTS  
The Redistributional Impact of Taxes and Social Transfers in 2014 
The estimates of the redistributive impact of Russia’s tax-benefit system under the 
baseline and sensitivity scenarios for contributory pensions are shown in Table 1. The 
comparison of the two scenarios shows that the total reduction of inequality through 
taxes and social transfers in Russia is mainly due to contributory pensions. Under the 
baseline scenario, inequality of market incomes as measured by the Gini coefficient is 
0.485 and this falls to 0.30 after the impact on incomes of taxes, transfers and in-kind 
services in education and health are taken into account—a decrease of 0.18 Gini points 
or 38.1%. Most of the inequality reduction comes through direct taxes and transfers, 
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mainly pensions, which altogether reduce the Gini by 0.15 points or 31.2%. Indirect 
taxes are regressive and unequalizing, i.e. they contribute to an increase in inequality by 
0.003 Gini points as compared to disposable income Gini. In-kind transfers, i.e. 
education and health services, are—as usually is the case—progressive and in Russia 
reduce the Gini by another 0.007 points as compared to consumable income. If 
contributory pensions are not classed as a transfer, then the redistributive impact of 
Russia’s tax-benefit system almost disappears. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 shows the estimates of progressivity and the distributional impact of each 
element of the tax-benefit system in Russia separately. Progressivity refers to the degree 
to which tax burdens and benefit entitlements rise or fall with household income. The 
summary measure of progressivity is the Kakwani index (Kakwani, 1977). The 
distributive impact of a tax or a transfer is measured as the marginal reduction in 
inequality due to the tax or the transfer, i.e. the absolute change in Gini index due to a 
removal of the transfer or the tax from household income (Reynolds and Smolensky, 
1977). Therefore, a positive value indicates that a tax or a transfer contributes to a 
decline in inequality.  
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Contributory pensions are highly progressive (with Kakwani index of 0.8) and play the 
prevailing role in inequality reduction due to the tax-benefit system in Russia (Table 2). 
Given the flat rate personal income tax (PIT) and regressive personal property taxes, 
direct taxes in Russia are mildly progressive in that higher deciles pay a higher share of 
their incomes in taxes. Social insurance contributions (SIC) are also somewhat 
progressive, despite the regressive tax schedule, as contributions are paid only by 
formal sector workers who tend to earn more than informal sector workers who do not 
pay, on average social security contributions. Both direct taxes and SIC contribute to a 
minor decline in inequality (by 0.02 Gini points). Indirect taxes—VAT and excise—are 
slightly regressive, as in many other countries, hence contribute to an increase in 
inequality (by 0.004 Gini points). The impact of the tax system as a whole on inequality 
in Russia is negligible (a 0.017 Gini points reduction). 
Direct transfers are the most redistributive element of the Russian welfare state (with 
overall Kakwani index of 0.8), but this effect is driven by pensions, while the degree of 
progressivity varies considerably for other direct transfers. The most progressive direct 
transfers are (quasi-insurance) unemployment benefits, means-tested housing subsidies, 
unified cash payments and other categorical cash and in-kind benefits. The latter two are 
the remnants of the Soviet social protection system. They consist of free services or 
discounts on payment for services provided to vulnerable categories of the population, 
such as people with disabilities, war veterans, or dependents of war victims. In 2005 a 
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part of these benefits was monetized and is now provided in a form of a unified monthly 
cash payment. The least progressive programs are elements of family support—
noticeably the maternity allowance and allowance for children younger than 1.5 years. 
These programs are mostly contributory and intended to help people to have families 
and so cannot solely be judged on their redistributive impact.  
Importantly, state social assistance and child allowances up to 16(18) years – the two 
means-tested programs – do not appear to be well targeted (their Kakwani indices are 
lower than those for categorical social assistance programmes). That said, non-
contributory pensions appear to be the only highly redistributive element of direct 
transfers besides contributory pensions, accounting for inequality reduction of 0.005 
Gini points. The redistributive impact of any other social transfer does not exceed 0.001 
Gini points. Thus the estimates of progressivity and redistributive impact for direct 
transfers demonstrate that Russia could have achieved more redistribution by focusing 
spending increases on programs that provide a greater benefit to the poor. 
Table 2 about here 
 
The distribution by decile shows that there is almost linear progressivity in the Russian 
tax-benefit system (Figure 1). The bottom six deciles are net beneficiaries from the 
system if in-kind health and education services are included, and the bottom four deciles 
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are net beneficiaries if only cash transfers and taxes are considered. The top four deciles 
are net payers to the system. The flat tax system limits the redistribution through the 
tax-benefit system: the richer seventh to tenth deciles pay a similar share of income 
(around 30%) in PIT and social security contributions. Government transfers (mostly 
pensions) dominate incomes for the lower income deciles. 
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
Tax-benefit policy also has important distributional implications for groups defined by 
characteristics other than income (Figure 2). Pensioners are the biggest beneficiaries 
from the budget. Meanwhile households of working-age people with and without 
children subsidize pensioner households and are net payees into the tax-benefit system. 
Prior to retirement age, the population makes net payments into the government budget, 
including children under 18 years of age based on calculations of contributions at the 
household basis. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
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Changes in Tax-Benefit System in Russia over 2010-2014 
The overall redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system increased from 2010 to 2014 
(Figure 3). While the Gini index for market incomes was nearly equal in 2014 and 2010, 
the tax-benefit system became more redistributive. The reduction in the Gini index from 
market to final income increased from 0.168 to 0.185 points.  
The main changes to design of the tax-benefit system in Russia over 2010-14 are 
summarized in Supplementary Appendix, Figure A3. They included: (i) an increase in 
the generosity of pension benefits; (ii) an increase in the base rate for social insurance 
contributions (SIC) from 26% in 2010 to 30% in 2012; and (iii) an increase in the 
thresholds for means-testing (often in real terms). The change in the redistributive 
impact of the tax-benefit system also reflects changes in household consumption and 
labor market adjustment strategies due to the macroeconomic situation. Most tax 
revenues and spending on transfers increased in real terms (estimated as nominal growth 
adjusted by CPI) over 2010-2014. Both revenues from social insurance contributions 
and indirect taxes increased more rapidly than GDP, with social insurance contributions 
increasing the most due to changed rates. Spending on education and health also rose 
faster than GDP, while growth in direct transfers was slower. Spending on pensions 
increased in real terms due to generous indexation and increases in the number of 
pensioners, though it stayed constant as share of GDP. 
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Pensions are being the largest contributor to the overall decrease in inequality in both 
2010 and 2014, as measured by changes in the Gini coefficient for final income before 
and after pensions. Pensions also explained the rise in the redistributive impact of the 
tax-benefit system from 2010 to 2014.  In contrast, the marginal contribution of other 
social transfers to inequality reduction in Russia has decreased. Direct taxes and social 
insurance contributions have a small positive impact on inequality reduction, and over 
2010-2014 the impact of SIC has increased, although the effect was much smaller than 
that of pensions. Indirect taxes have almost no redistributive effect, while the effect of 
in-kind transfers (health and education) was at a similar level in the two years. 
 
Figure 3 about here  
 
Russian Tax-Benefit System in International Context 
Russia achieves a moderate reduction in inequality through taxes and benefits, 
compared to the majority of European Union (EU) countries (Figure 4). This assessment 
assumes that pensions are transfers rather than deferred income. The structure of taxes 
and benefits can differ, but where there is a large reduction in inequality due to tax-
benefit policy, there generally is a broad mix of redistributional benefits and taxes. 
20 
 
Apart from pensions, none of the components of the system of direct transfers and taxes 
appears to have a large impact on inequality in Russia.   
 
Figure 4 about here  
 
Figure 5 shows a comparison of the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers in 
Russia with two countries that are similar to Russia in terms of the size of the territory 
and the overall inequality level, Brasil and the United States. Both appear to be laggards 
in terms of the size of redistribution in comparison to the EU member states (Gough, 
2013; Garfinkel et al., 2010). Depending on the treatment of contributory pensions, the 
welfare state of Russia can look more redistributive than that of the United States or less 
redistributive as that of Brasil. In the former case, contributory pensions are included in 
direct transfers, in the latter case they are treated as part of market income.   
 
Figure 5 about here  
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CONCLUSIONS 
There have been few attempts to measure the redistributive capacities of the former 
Soviet Union countries, including Russia, and to determine where they stand in relation 
to the established welfare states in Europe and beyond. This paper attempts to fill this 
gap in the literature by assessing the redistributive effort of the contemporary Russian 
welfare state. The distributional impact of the main tax and social spending programs in 
Russia is measured using a state-of-the-art methodological approach that enables us to 
take into account the role of indirect taxes, education and healthcare spending and the 
second-order effects of the public pension system.   
Overall, institutional reforms of the welfare system initiated in Russia after the 
beginning of market transition proved heavily constrained and path dependent. The 
contemporary Russian welfare state represents a mix of a state socialist and liberal/ 
residual welfare models and achieves a moderate reduction in inequality through tax-
benefit policy. The Gini coefficient shows a more equal income distribution and lower 
poverty when calculated on incomes after payment of taxes and receipt of government 
benefits and in-kind services than before. This assumes that contributory pensions are 
considered government transfers (rather than deferred income) and social insurance 
contributions are considered taxes. Direct taxes and transfers in Russia have a 
significantly smaller impact on income inequality compared to the majority of European 
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Union economies, yet achieve a larger reduction in inequality than that of the United 
States and Brasil.   
As far as the impact of the main elements of the tax-benefit system is concerned, the tax 
system overall is regressive, with a large share of tax revenues coming from regressive 
indirect taxes and social insurance contributions, while direct taxes are almost neutral, 
mostly because of the flat rate of personal income tax. Indirect taxes are disequalizing, 
i.e. contribute to an increase in inequality. In-kind transfers, i.e. education and health 
services, are—as usually is the case—progressive and equalizing. Most redistribution 
due to tax-benefit policy occurs through pensions. Social assistance programs play a 
limited role in Russia and are not well targeted.  
There is considerable potential to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
redistributive system, which is especially important in conditions of the downfall that 
severely limits budget capacities. Increasing the now very limited use of means testing 
for eligibility for social protection programs could save money, while channeling more 
assistance to the poor. Broadening the tax base and increasing tax compliance, while 
shifting from the excessive reliance on regressive indirect taxes (e.g. the VAT) to more 
progressive direct taxes (e.g. personal and corporate income taxes) could improve 
progressivity while raising revenues. A gradual increase in the retirement age and the 
reduction of pensions for working pensioners or workers who are eligible for early 
retirement could equitably distribute the burden of limits on pension spending.  
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The CEQ framework used in this paper is a powerful tool for evaluating the impact of 
tax-benefit policies, but it is essential to consider a broader framework when designing 
government policy to increase redistribution. Income distribution should not be the only 
consideration, and analysis needs to bring together equity considerations with the need 
for the tax system to support economic efficiency, while ensuring adequate revenues. 
The impact of tax and spending policies need to be evaluated jointly, and the impact of 
institutional policies beyond the budget should be considered. For example, measures to 
reduce the alarmingly high growth in informality could improve the sustainability of 
pensions and reduce the vulnerability of low-income workers. Trade-offs between 
equity and efficiency need to be considered, and the long-term impact of policies taken 
into account. The analysis on policy options should consider the administrative costs of 
tax measure and likely impacts on compliance. More subnational analysis is important 
to understand the incidence of tax-benefit policy choices, particularly as there are large 
differences in incomes or fiscal situations among regions.  
CEQ analysis is based on household surveys, in which the rich are likely 
underrepresented (this is important in Russia, where two thirds of wealth is owned by 
just one percent of the population). One approach to improving the coverage of top 
income earners is to combine household survey with individual-level tax administration 
data. This also allows a broadening of the scope of the analysis to cover in a more 
detailed way capital and corporate income taxation. Finally, it is critical to take into 
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account the quality of spending on in-kind services such as health and education to 
evaluate the impact of government policy. 
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Table 1. Russia: Social Policy and Inequality, 2014 
  
Market 
Income 
Disposable Income 
Consumable 
Income 
Final Income 
(+ net direct taxes 
and transfers) 
(+ net indirect 
taxes) 
(+ transfers 
in-kind) 
Baseline scenario: Contributory pensions as government transfers 
Gini index 0.485 0.334 0.337 0.300 
absolute change wrt market 
income 
-- -0.15 -0.15 -0.18 
% change wrt market income -- -31.2 -30.5 -38.1 
Sensitivity scenario: Contributory pensions as market income 
Gini index 0.358 0.334 0.337 0.300 
absolute change wrt market 
income 
-- -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 
% change wrt market income -- -6.8 -5.8 -16.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on RLMS-HSE 2014.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Russia: Measure of Progressivity by Tax and Spending Instruments 
(baseline scenario for pensions), 2014 
  
Kakwani 
Marginal Contributions 
% of GDP 
  
Market to 
Disposable 
Market to 
Consumable 
Market to 
Final 
Redistributive Effect -- 0.151 0.148 0.185 -- 
All Taxes -0.029 -- 0.017 0.027 17.86% 
All Transfers 0.676 -- -- 0.179 19.47% 
All Direct Taxes 0.035 0.020 0.020 0.028 10.84% 
All Direct Transfers 0.775 0.143 0.169 0.145 11.32% 
All Indirect Taxes -0.197 -- -0.004 0.000 7.02% 
All Inkind Transfers 0.429 -- -- 0.034 8.16% 
Social Insurance Contributions 0.028 0.011 0.011 0.017 7.05% 
Personal income tax 0.050 0.008 0.008 0.011 3.78% 
Property and land taxes -0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Contributory pensions 0.791 0.115 0.134 0.118 8.11% 
Non-contributory Pensions 0.787 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.48% 
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Kakwani 
Marginal Contributions 
% of GDP 
  
Market to 
Disposable 
Market to 
Consumable 
Market to 
Final 
Unemployment benefit 0.967 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.04% 
Unified cash payments 0.856 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.89% 
Other categorical benefits (cash 
and in-kind) 
0.823 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.85% 
Maternity allowance 0.217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.13% 
Lump-sum birth grant 0.443 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.03% 
Compensation of childcare fees 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.02% 
Maternity capital 0.706 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.38% 
Child allowance up to 1.5 years 0.188 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.17% 
Child allowance up to 16 (18) 
years 
0.607 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.07% 
State social assistance 0.765 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.03% 
Housing subsidy 0.892 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.08% 
Scholarships 0.573 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.02% 
Vat -0.200 0.002 -0.002 0.000 5.52% 
Notes: The Kakwani index uses the Gini framework to measure the progressivity of spending and taxes. The 
larger the index, the more progressive is the expenditure or tax.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS-HSE for 2014.  
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Figure 1. Russia: Distributional Impact of Different Components of the Tax and 
Benefit System by Market Income Deciles, in Percent of Disposable Income 
(baseline scenario for pensions), 2014 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS-HSE 2014. 
 
 
 
By Socioeconomic Groups By Age Groups 
 
Figure 2. Net Benefits (+) or Payments (-) After Tax-Benefit Interventions, in 
percent of Market Income (baseline scenario for pensions), 2014 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS-HSE 2014. 
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Figure 3. Russia: Impact of Main Components of Tax-benefit System on Inequality, 
from Market to Final Income (baseline scenario for pensions) 
Note:  The figure shows the impact of each instrument on inequality as changes in Gini points from market 
income to final (positive number indicates a decline in the Gini).  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS-HSE 2010 and 2014.  
 
 
Figure 4. Distributional Impact of Direct Taxes and Transfers in the European 
Union and Russia (baseline scenario for pensions), 2014 
Notes: Distributional impact is defined as the difference between Gini for market incomes and Gini for 
disposable incomes, expressed as a percentage of market income Gini.  
Sources: For Russia – authors’ calculations based on RLMS-HSE 2014; for EU countries –  EUROMOD 
Webstatistics for version G4.0 (via https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/statistics). 
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Contributory pensions as deferred income Contributory pensions as transfers 
Figure 5. Distributional Impact of Different Components of the Tax-Benefit System 
in Brasil, United States and Russia, circa 2010, in Percent of Market Income  
Notes: Distributional impact is defined as the difference between Gini for market incomes and Gini for 
disposable income, Gini for post-fiscal income, and Gini for final income, expressed as a percentage of 
market income Gini.    
Sources: For Russia – Lustig et al. (2017); for Brasil and the United States – Higgins et al. (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Supplementary Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1. Russia: Changes in GDP, Real Disposable Income and Income 
Inequality, 1991-2015   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Rosstat data 
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Table A1. Social spending in Russia, 2014 
   
Spending 
Total 
amount in 
NAs, 
billions of 
rubles 
% of 
GDP 
Included 
in 
Analysis 
(Yes/No) 
Contributory pensions 5,792.3 8.1% yes 
Direct  transfers 3,229.1 4.5%   
     Non-contributory (social) pensions 344.5 0.5% yes 
     Unemployment benefit and ALMPs (quasi insurance) 35.5 0.0%   
     Social insurance benefits 578.0 0.8%   
           Maternity leave allowance 95.7 0.1% yes 
           Lump-sum allowance on child birth/family placement  21.4 0.0% yes 
           Child care allowance up to 1.5 years 121.4 0.2% yes 
           Temporary incapacity benefit  178.8 0.3%   
           Other  160.7 0.2%   
     Social assistance benefits 1,849.8 2.6%   
          Not means-tested benefits 1,546.3 2.2%   
                   Unified cash payments 636.9 0.9% yes 
                   Other categorical benefits (cash and in kind) 610.0 0.9% yes 
                   Maternity capital 270.7 0.4% yes 
                   Compensation for child care 16.2 0.0% yes 
                   Special forms of support for families with 
children 
299.4 0.4%   
                    Other benefits (scholarships etc.) 12.5 0.0% yes 
        Means-tested benefits 303.5 0.4%   
                   Child allowance up to 16(18) years 46.4 0.1% yes 
                   Housing subsidy 59.7 0.1% yes 
                   State social assistance 22.4 0.0% yes 
                   Social supplement to pension  152.6 0.2% * 
                   Monthly cash payment for the third child 22.3 0.0%   
      Social care and other social programs 421.3 0.6%   
Education 3,037.3 4.3%   
        Childcare/preschool 658.1 0.9% yes 
        Primary/secondary 1,414.7 2.0% yes 
        Vocational  201.8 0.3% yes 
        Tertuary 519.7 0.7% yes 
         Other  242.9 0.3%   
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Healthcare 2,786.3 3.9%   
  Primary (outpatient) care & in-patient care 2,532.7 3.5% yes 
  Physical culture and sports 253.6 0.4%   
Total social spending 15,040.5 21.1%   
Sources: Federal Treasury data (http://www.roskazna.ru/); Laws on implementation of the Federal 
and Regional budgets; Federal State Statistics Service data (http://www.gks.ru/), Statistical digest 
"Social situation and living standards of the population of Russia"; Federal Employment Service data 
(http://www.rostrud.ru/). 
Note: * Social supplement to pensions is counted as part of a pension in RLMS-HSE data 
 
Table A2. Tax revenues in Russia, 2014 
   
Tax revenues 
Total 
amount in 
NAs, 
billions of 
rubles 
% of 
GDP 
Included 
in 
Analysis 
(Yes/No) 
Social insurance contributions 5,035.7 7.1%   
    Pension contributions 3,712.7 5.2% Yes 
    Social insurance contributions 508.6 0.7% Yes 
    Healthcare contributions 1,218.7 1.7% Yes 
Personal income tax  2,702.6 3.8% Yes** 
VAT 3,940.2 5.5% Yes 
Excise taxes 1,072.2 1.5% Yes 
Income tax paid by SMEs* 315.1 0.4%   
Corporate profit tax 2,375.3 3.3%   
Property taxes 957.5 1.3% Yes*** 
Taxes on natural resource extraction 2,934.7 4.1%   
Export and import duties 5,463.7 7.7%   
Revenues from public property 797.2 1.1%   
Fees for using natural resources 261.5 0.4%   
Other revenues 910.4 1.3%   
Total revenues 26,766.1 37.5%   
Sources: Federal State Statistics Service data (http://www.gks.ru/) 
Notes:  
* Small and medium-sized enterprises 
** Standard tax allowances are taken into account but their impact is negligible, thus they were not 
included in the analysis as a separate category. 
*** Partial estimate, because only personal property, land and vehicle taxes are included in 
simulations.  
 
37 
 
General Government Expenditures  General Government Revenues 
 
Figure A2. Russia: General Government Expenditures by Function and General 
Government Revenues by Type, Changes between 2005-2014 in % of GDP 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Ministry of Finance and Rosstat data. 
 
 
Figure A3. Russia: Growth of Spending on/Revenue from the Main Components of 
Tax-benefit System over 2010-2014 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS-HSE 2010 and 2014. 
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